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Abstract 
 
Turkmenistan is one of the 25 former socialist countries in Europe and Central Asia that em-
barked on a transition from plan to market in the early 1990s. In agriculture, the transition was 
expected to improve the productivity of the chronically inefficient collective farming inherited 
from the Soviet era. Improvements were to be achieved through the transfer of land and assets 
from collective farms to individual operators, in line with the established practice of agriculture in 
market economies.  This study examines the progress of agricultural reform in Turkmenistan by 
focusing on land distribution, farm structure transformation, and changes in production patterns, 
marketing, and farm performance. The study is based on a survey of 143 private farmers con-
ducted in Turkmenistan in 2000. Preliminary results indicate that, despite fairly generous alloca-
tion of land to individual farming, no significant performance improvements have been achieved 
so far, primarily because private farmers operate under severe environmental, institutional and 
political constraints.  
 
 
1.  Overview of Land Reform in Turkmenistan 
 
Turkmenistan is a highly agrarian country, over half of the population is rural, and 44% of the labor force is 
employed in agriculture. Agriculture is the second most important sector in the Turkmen economy after the oil and 
gas industry. The territory of Turkmenistan is largely desert with irrigated arable land constituting less than 4% of 
the total. The most important cash crops are cotton and wheat; cotton is exported after processing into fiber while 
wheat is consumed domestically. Turkmenistan also produces livestock, as well as fruits and vegetables for domestic 
consumption. 
 
Prior to the declaration of independence in 1991, Turkmenistan was one of the least developed republics in 
the Soviet Union and its agriculture was based on cotton monoculture. After 1991, Turkmenistan began raising 
wheat production, to reduce its dependence on food imports from former Soviet republics, which also had become 
independent states with independent interests and trade policies (Lerman and Brooks 1998). 
 
Turkmenistan is the only country in Central Asia in which the post-Soviet constitution formally recognized 
private land ownership. The Constitution, however, only sets general principles, while the definition of ownership as 
well as practical implementation are left to laws, presidential decrees, and government resolutions. As a result, the 
actual rights of landowners in Turkmenistan are similar to those of landholders in ―lifetime inheritable possession‖ 
according to the Soviet Civil Code in the pre-1990 era. Although land received for private farming is classified as 
privately owned, it cannot be sold, given as a gift, or exchanged. In addition, if privately owned agricultural land is 
left uncultivated, the owners may lose their private property through administrative measures (Lerman and Brooks 
1998).  
 
Prior to the adoption of the new Constitution of May 1992, all land in Turkmenistan was state-owned. Over 
95% of the arable land was  permanently  used by  576 large-scale farms  (1,500-2,500 hectares on the average)  and  
_______________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
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around 2% were allocated in lifetime inheritable possession to rural households (less than 0.2 hectare on the aver-
age). The latter produced 20% of gross agricultural product. Land reform started in 1993 with the conversion of 
household plots from inheritable possession into private ownership. At the same time virgin and unutilized land was 
transferred from the State Land Fund to private ownership and long-term leases (10-99 years, mainly 10-20 years) of 
individual farmers. 
 
The agrarian reform program in Turkmenistan combined the recognition of the acknowledged benefits of 
individual farming with the deeply rooted socialist belief in economies of scale and in the associated central control 
tools (for details see Lerman and Brooks (1998, 2001), Mkrytichyan et al. (2000), and O’Hara (1997)). In accor-
dance with these principles, in 1995 the traditional collective and state farms were reorganized into 570 associations 
of leaseholders (daikhan berleshik, or peasant associations). Each leaseholder was allocated state-owned arable land 
for individual production within the umbrella of the association. Yet the government maintained state procurement 
orders, especially for the two strategic commodities – cotton and wheat, supplementing it with an extensive system 
of subsidized inputs and credits. The leaseholders received land for individual production, but no freedom of decid-
ing what to produce. Legislation passed in 1996 facilitated the leasing of land from peasant associations to their 
members, and in the following year there was a dramatic shift from collective farming in the associations to member 
leasing. The majority of association farmland is now leased to members. After a two-year probation period, farmers 
may be given full ownership if the land has been used productively. By contrast, the lease may be revoked if land is 
not used productively. 
 
In a parallel strand of reform, Turkmenistan encouraged the establishment of so-called peasant (daikhan) 
farms – independent family farms operating outside associations and enjoying relative freedom from state orders. 
This freedom, however, had a price: the private farmers were given virgin land in the desert and were required to 
convert it by themselves into productive irrigated land within two years. Land quality was intended to differentiate 
private farmers from leaseholders, who received irrigated land within the bounds of their associations. While the 
conversion of former collective and state farms into leaseholder associations was a unique Turkmen procedure (with 
some analogies observed only in Uzbekistan), the creation of peasant farms outside traditional collectivist frame-
works is a general agrarian reform strategy used in all former Soviet republics. 
 
The present article focuses on the peasant farms of Turkmenistan. It is based on the results of a survey con-
ducted in 2000 on a sample of 143 peasant farmers in four of the five administrative regions Turkmenistan. After a 
general discussion of the emergence of private farming in Turkmenistan, we present a preliminary analysis of survey 
findings and try to answer the question posed in the title: Does land reform, as represented by the new subsector of 
private farms, work in Turkmenistan? Figures and tables given without an explicit source are based on original sur-
vey data. 
 
2.  Emergence of Peasant Farms in Turkmenistan 
 
The creation of private farms in Turkmenistan was enabled by legislation adopted in 1992-1996. According 
to the 1993 presidential decree, Turkmen citizen could apply to receive without any payment up to 50 ha of land in 
private ownership for individual commercial farming. This land, however, was not necessarily arable or irrigated. 
The presidential decree specifically stipulated that local authorities would allocate land plots for individual commer-
cial farming from reserve lands, virgin lands, and lands not used by farm enterprises (which later became peasant as-
sociations). The new farmers were thus expected to ―open‖ virgin lands by their own efforts and using their own re-
sources. Yet the new farmers were in the danger of losing their land if they failed to start farming commercially 
within two years. The stipulation was probably unrealistic, given the tremendous difficulties that individuals would 
face in ―opening‖ virgin lands and providing irrigation in the desert. Nevertheless, such ―opening‖ of virgin lands by 
private farmers since 1993 (115,000 hectares, or 0.3% of all agricultural land) accounts for part of the considerable 
increase in the irrigated area observed during the recent years. The hardship associated with allocation of virgin 
lands was partially offset by exempting peasant farmers from taxation for the first five years and making them eligi-
ble to receive credit at low interest rates much below the rate of inflation. 
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Of the 115,000 hectares transferred to peasant farmers as of January 2000, 90,200 hectares are in private 
ownership and 24,800 hectares are in long-term leases. The fastest pace of land allocation to peasant farming was 
observed during the first three years after the 1993 decree: 93% of land in private ownership and 59% of the land 
under long-term leases was allocated up to 1996. During 1996-2000, the land allocated in private ownership in-
creased by a mere 700 hectares and the leased component increased by 8,800 hectares (Figure 1). 
 
According to land records, there were 7,066 peasant farms at the end of 1999. However, only 2,039 farms 
were registered with the state statistical agencies, and 1,103 provided reports about their activity. These 1,103 pea-
sant farms are the actively producing component of 
the private farming sector in Turkmenistan, and the 
143 peasant farms included in the survey represent 
13% of the report providers.  
 
The threat of losing land if it remains un-
cultivated for more than two years is quite real. In 
total, peasant farmers have lost nearly 25 thousand 
hectares due to failure to meet the startup condi-
tions. This happened because in many cases the 
land received from the state required significant in-
vestment due to poor quality and remote location, 
and not everyone had the necessary financial and 
technical resources for developing this land.  
 
3.  Peasant Farms in the Survey 
 
The survey provides farm-level information about resources and farming activities, as well as the demo-
graphic profile of the families of peasant farmers. 
 
3.1  Family profile 
 
The overwhelming majority of farmers in 
the survey are men (95%). The average farmer is 
48 years old, while the average age of all family 
members is about 30. The mean family size in the 
sample is 5.6 persons. The educational attainment 
of farmers is quite high: 58% of respondents report 
higher education and only 5% have less than 10 
years of schooling. This is in a dramatic contrast to 
the rest of the rural population, where according to 
a parallel survey only 10% report higher education, 
while 85% have secondary school background 
(Lerman and Stanchin 2001). Men generally have a 
higher educational attainment than women in rural 
households. Figure 2 shows clear gender differenc-
es in the level of education between men and wom-
en in farmers' families: most women have second-
ary education, while men generally continue to ac-
quire some higher education. 
 
About 56% of the farmers surveyed previously worked in a farm enterprise (a collective or state farm); the 
rest worked in industry or services outside agriculture. Farmers had held relatively high positions in their former 
jobs: 65% of respondents had had managerial or professional jobs, 10% described themselves as qualified workers, 
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and 15% as administrative staff in their previous position. Private farmers thus bring with them a rich agricultural 
experience and a high educational attainment to their new occupation. 
 
The land allocated to private farmers is usually far from the village, often in the middle of the desert. As a 
result, only 14% of respondents live with their families on the territory of the farm, while 57% continue to live in the 
village run by the peasant association with which the farm is administratively linked and 29% are domiciled in other 
villages or townships (Table 1). The rural housing is generally deficient in basic amenities. Nearly half the respon-
dents have no running water, no electricity, and no gas in the house. Electricity is reported by 30% of private far-
mers, gas by 12%, and running water by 4% only. 
 
 
                                             Table 1 Where does the family live? 
 All farms 
Farms using 
own land 
Farms using 
leased land 
On the territory of the farm 14.1 22.4 8.3 
In the village of the peasant association 57.0 37.9 70.2 
In another village 6.3 8.6 4.8 
In the district center 19.0 27.6 13.1 
Other 3.5 3.4 3.6 
 
 
3.2  Land 
 
Among the 143 farms surveyed, 60 had land allocated in private ownership and 83 were using leased land. 
None of the farms reported using both own and leased land. This essentially is a reflection of the existing institu-
tional arrangements for land allocation in Turkmenistan, where the decision on whether land is given in private 
ownership or leased does not depend on the applicant: it is decided by government land authorities on the basis of 
certain political considerations, which are totally non-transparent to outsiders.  
 
Farm sizes varied from 1 hectare to 370 hectares, but most farms (88%) did not exceed 50 hectares, which 
is the legal limit for privately owned land. Farms based on own land averaged 19 hectares, whereas farms using 
leased land reached larger sizes, averaging 39 hectares. Most of the land is arable (68%), with 0.2% under perennials 
and 27.5% in pasture. Other land constitutes 4.6% and is not used actively.  
 
Land allocated to peasant farms was classified in three quality categories: 1 — land of satisfactory quality 
prepared for cultivation, 2 — land prepared for irrigation but requiring further amelioration, and 3 — unprepared 
virgin land. In line with existing legislation, a large share of land allocated to farmers in the survey was unprepared 
virgin land from state reserves, which required a large investment in improvement and amelioration. Farmers receiv-
ing land in private ownership ended up with much more virgin land than farmers who were given land in long-term 
lease (Figure 3). Officials probably give the worst land in private ownership, while for the time being retaining bet-
ter lands in the state reserve.  
Figure 3 Quality of land allocated to peasant 
farms in private ownership and in long-term 
lease: 
1 – land of satisfactory quality prepared for cultivation,  
2 – land prepared for irrigation but requiring 
further amelioration, 3 – unprepared virgin 
land 
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In general, farmers were satisfied with the quality of land they had received, although ameliorative im-
provements were required for 61% of land received in private ownership and 22% of arable land given in long-term 
lease. Land improvement normally involves leveling rough native terrain, moving large volumes of sand, trucking in 
equally large volumes of fertile soil from afar, and providing irrigation ditches or pipes from relatively distant water 
sources. The average cost of development of 1 hectare for the farmers surveyed was about 650 thousand manats
1
, 
i.e., $125 at the official rate of exchange and about $30 at the free-market rate. This is about one-third of the annual 
net profit per hectare of cotton, but more than two years of profits from wheat production (see Table 5 below for de-
tails). In spite of the investment so far, half the arable land in the sample still requires radical improvement. This was 
reported by 72% of respondents, but only half the farmers said they could afford the cost of land improvement work 
in the coming 3 years. The main obstacles for improvement are lack of money and machinery (two-thirds of respon-
dents who would not be able to invest in land improvement).  
 
Less than half the respondents reported cultivating their entire land holdings. The main reason for underuti-
lization of land is lack of means for land development, as reported by 41% of respondents. Among other reasons, 
19% of farmers noted difficulties with access to farm supplies and machinery, 25% complained about absence or ir-
regularity of irrigation.  
 
3.3  Irrigation 
 
Under the prevailing climatic conditions in Turkmenistan, irrigation is indispensable to agriculture and it 
was developed extensively throughout the cultivable parts of country in the Soviet times. Surface irrigation remains 
the dominant technique, although micro-irrigation is being introduced on an experimental scale (in 1994, micro-
irrigation covered a mere 400 hectares, or 0.02% of total irrigated area) All the main canals, major parts of the inter-
farm and intra-farm irrigation networks, and all the collector and drainage networks are above the ground. With such 
irrigation systems, water loss is up to one-fifth of the intake due to seepage and evaporation (Orlovsky et al. 2001). 
Yet practically all the respondents (97%) consider furrow irrigation as the most effective method, probably because 
they do not know any other irrigation methods.  
 
All private farms have access to an external ir-
rigation network or at least to local water sources. Thus, 
62% receive water from man-made irrigation networks, 
30% of farms irrigate their fields from wells, rivers, or 
other local water sources, and 8% access other water 
sources. The distribution of water sources is different for 
farms based on own land and farms using leased land 
(Table 2). These differences may affect the quality of 
water (salinization, contamination).  
 
Although all private farms have access to wa-
ter, only 20% of farms report receiving water on time 
and even then much less than the required norms (Table 
3). It is hard to expect high yields in the desert under 
such conditions: expert estimates show that reduction of 
watering by 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50% reduces crop 
yields by 4%, 9%, 15%, 24%, or 36%, respectively 
(Khamidov et al. 2001). Farmers try to compensate for 
these shortages by using mineralized water from drai-
nage collectors, lakes, and ground sources. Irrigation 
with saline water worsens soil quality and depresses 
                                                          
1
 The national currency, the manat, was introduced in November 1993with the initial rate $0.5 for 1 manat. The currency depreciated rapidly. In 
April 1998, the currency was pegged at 5200 per dollar, close to the market rate. Since then the government has maintained the official rate de-
spite strong excess demand for foreign currency. The parallel exchange rate fell precipitously to over three times the official rate by mid 1999 
and to four times the official rate by late 2000. 
Table 3 Actual waterings in percent of the norm 
 
All farms 
Farmers 
using own 
land 
Farmers 
using 
leased land 
Cotton 55.0 75.7 50.3 
Wheat 55.0 56.0 54.4 
Vegetables 67.6 71.8 58.1 
Alfalfa 63.3 68.3 50.0 
Gardens 56.7 56.5 57.1 
Vineyard 90.0 100.0 80.0 
 
 
Table 2 Sources of water for irrigation, % of respondents 
 Water sources 
local 
man-made 
networks 
other 
All farms 29.4 62.2 8.4 
Farms using own land 16.7 81.7 1.7 
Farms using leased land 38.6 48.2 13.3 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                             Volume 2, Number 2 
 98 
crop yields. At present 80% of Turkmenistan’s irrigated soils are saline, and salinization reduces output by 40% 
(Khakimov 1986). During fall-winter, special activities are required to flush the salt from the soil. 
 
No private irrigation schemes exist in Turkmenistan. All are managed by a state agency, and they are gen-
erally larger than 10,000 hectares, having been originally designed and built for large collective and state farms. 
Among the respondents in the survey, only 6% own their irrigation equipment and 6% are responsible for maintain-
ing the irrigation network. Water is allocated to each farm on the basis of standard crop requirements. If a farm ex-
ceeds its allocation, a fine is applied, based on the excess water usage. In 1995, the fine was 0.503 manat/m
3
, or 20 
cents per 1,000 m
3
. This is a symbolic charge that does not reflect the real value of water. Moreover, the fine is hard-
ly ever applied, because the inefficient and insufficient irrigation prevents farmers from receiving even the minimum 
amounts of water. 
 
3.4  Farm Production 
 
Practically all peasant farmers engage in crop production (Table 4). Livestock is reported by a much small-
er proportion of farms: less than 20% of respondents have mixed crop-livestock farming, and only 5% specialize in 
livestock without any crop production. About 80% of farms grow wheat, although wheat production is substantially 
less profitable than cotton (Table 5). By contrast, among leaseholders in peasant associations (former collective or 
state farms) surveyed in a previous study (Lerman and Brooks 2001), 80% grow cotton and only 20% grow wheat. 
Authorities do not explicitly prescribe what private farmers must produce, while the production specialization of 
leaseholders in peasant associations is strictly controlled. However, cotton cannot be grown without irrigation, whe-
reas many private farms established on virgin land still suffer from shortage of water. Farms using leased land have 
better access to local water sources, such as wells and rivers (see Table 2), which are more reliable than the poorly 
maintained man-made irrigation networks. Better access to water probably explains the higher tendency of these 
farms to grow cotton (Table 4). Cotton production also requires ten times more labor per ton than wheat (Guchgel-
diev 1999), which may be a barrier to the adoption of cotton in family-based private farms.  
 
 
Table 4 Specialization profile of peasant farmers (% of respondents) 
 
Crops Livestock 
Crops and 
livestock 
Wheat Cotton Vegetables 
All farms 77.6 4.9 17.5 81.0 29.4 11.2 
Farms using own land 70.0 10.0 20.0 83.3 11.7 16.7 
Farms using leased land 83.1 1.2 15.7 78.3 42.2 6.0 
 
 
Table 5 Comparative costs and profit of wheat and cotton production in 1999 (national data). 
 Peasant associations Private farms 
Cotton Wheat Cotton Wheat 
Sown area, thousand ha 500.9 610.9 13.6 6.8 
Yield, ton/ha 1.69 1.53 3.60 1.51 
Gross output, thousand ton 844.9 937.2 48.9 10.2 
Revenue, billion manat 786.4 397.6 48.8 4.3 
Total costs, billion manat 266.4 243.4 21.4 2.5 
Total profit, billion manat 520,0 154.2 27.4 1.8 
Costs per 1 ton, thousand manat 315.0 260.0 437.0 245.0 
Costs per 1 hectare, thousand manat 532.0 398.0 1573.0 367.0 
Profit per 1 hectare, thousand manat 1038.0 252.0 2014.0 264.0 
Source: Lerman and Stanchin, 2001. 
 
 
Livestock production (whether specialized or as part of mixed farming) appears to be more widespread 
among farmers using own land than among those with leased land (see Table 4). Yet the average cattle herd is much 
larger on farms using leased land: 41 head of cattle compared with 18 head of cattle for farms operating on own 
land. The opposite is true with respect to poultry, which is more popular among farmers operating on own land: 61% 
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of the own farms versus 24% of leased farms. The average flock is also much larger – 638 chickens in farms with 
own land versus only 49 in farms using leased land. Sheep and goats, the traditional animals in Turkmenistan, are 
reported by less than one-third of farmers with livestock (8% of all farms surveyed). Livestock productivity that 
emerges from survey data is very low (Table 6) and it is generally comparable with the productivity reported by 
leaseholders in peasant associations, who achieve milk yields of about 1,200 kg per cow per year and egg laying ca-
pacities of about 70 eggs per layer per year (Lerman and Brooks 2001). 
 
The various reasons given by respondents for not going into livestock production mainly reflect capital 
constraints. Thus, 68% of farmers lack the means to purchase animals, 54% lack facilities for keeping livestock and 
poultry, and 38% experience difficulties with machinery and purchased inputs.  
 
 
Table 6 Herd/flock size, livestock production (per one farm) and productivity (per one animal) 
 Average herd/flock size, heads Production Productivity 
 
Cattle 
Including 
cows 
Sheep 
and goat 
Chickens 
Meat, 
tons 
Milk,  
tons 
Eggs, 
pieces 
Milk, 
kg 
Eggs, 
pieces 
All farms 30.3 11.2 106.2 454.2 1.73 11.00 17505 1219 95 
Farms using own land 17.6 7.8 117.0 638.5 1.86 10.19 25546 967 91 
Farms using leased land 40.9 14.2 95.3 49.0 1.81 13.06 4103 1507 105 
 
 
The private farmers show a high degree of commercialization. Most of the output is sold. This includes all 
the cotton, 85% of wheat, 90% of grapes, and about 60% of livestock production (milk, meat, and eggs). On the oth-
er hand, more than half the output of vegetables and melons are consumed in the household.  
 
3.5  Farm Services: Marketing and Input Supply 
 
Until 1996 all agricultural services, including input supply, processing, and marketing, were the responsi-
bility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. After 1996, the responsibility for the main farm services was trans-
ferred from the Ministry to a number of autonomous state-controlled service organizations specializing in various 
farm-related services. Among these parastatals, Turkmenobakhyzmat is responsible for the provision of all services 
related to the use of machinery, Turkmenpagta provides inputs for cotton production and is responsible for cotton 
marketing, Turkmengalla is the wheat purchasing agency, and Turkmenmallary controls livestock-related services 
(including actual ownership of some sheep herds). In addition to managing the flow of services to independent pea-
sant farmers and to leaseholders in peasant associations, these organizations also collect the state subsidies that al-
low farmers to pay only half price for all inputs, such as machinery, seeds, fertilizers, and herbicides. 
 
Although private farmers have never been subject to any state orders for the production of wheat and cot-
ton, they were originally obligated to sell these strategic commodities to the two parastatals, Turkmengalla and 
Turkmenpagta, which paid prices far below world market prices, while at the same time subsidizing 50% of input 
costs. In the late 1990s, producers received only about 40% of the market value of their wheat and cotton, while the 
input subsidies offset between one-third and one-half of this negative difference (Lerman and Brooks 2001). Agri-
cultural producers in Turkmenistan are thus heavily taxed by the government’s price policies. Since June 1996, pri-
vate farmers are allowed to sell wheat and cotton at freely negotiated prices on the State Commodity Exchange and, 
in the case of wheat, also in the open market. However, such free sales involve forgoing the input subsidy. Table 7 
shows that only a small percentage of respondents channel their wheat and cotton sales through the Commodity Ex-
change, and most sales continue to be directed to the parastatals, presumably in the interest of securing the substan-
tial input subsidies. Nevertheless, over 20% of wheat sellers report selling their grain in the open market, which is 
also the main outlet for the unregulated products, such as vegetables, meat, and milk. Since most cotton and wheat is 
sold through parastatals, over 80% of producers complain that the prices they receive are too low. Many also com-
plain about delays in payment by the marketers (75% of cotton producers and 44% of wheat producers). 
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Table 7 Channels of sales (% of respondents) 
 Wheat Cotton Vegetables Melons Meat Milk 
Parastatal marketing agencies 71.4 97.2 -- -- -- 3.8 
Market and consumers 21.0 -- 77.8 80.0 77.3 88.5 
State Commodity Exchange 5.7 2.8 22.2 20.0 9.1 3.8 
 
 
Many of the farmers who received land from the state did not have the necessary farm machinery and gen-
erally could not afford to buy it. Half the farmers surveyed actually own production assets of one kind or another in-
cluding machinery and equipment, farm buildings, and other. Own machinery is reported by 35% of farmers; 30% 
of respondents own tractors, and 12% own trucks. The average farm has 1.1 units of machinery of any kind, and the 
area serviced by one unit is 19 hectares. The available own machinery is not sufficient for actual farm needs. Most 
farmers, both with and without own machinery, purchase mechanized field services and transport services from out-
side sources (Table 8). As a result, despite the limited spread of machinery ownership among farmers, practically 
everybody has access to machinery services through rental arrangements with parastatals and even private service 
suppliers (Table 9).  
 
 
Table 8 Machinery ownership and purchase of machinery-related services by farmers 
 
% of farmers 
% of them purchasing 
mechanizes field services transport services 
Farmers with any own machinery 35.0 72.0 65.0 
Farmers without own machinery 65.0 91.4 88.2 
 
 
The farmers use the standard range of purchased inputs and farm services. Over 90% of farmers in the sur-
vey purchase fertilizers, seeds, and machinery-related services (Table 9). Inputs specific to livestock production are 
purchased by a relatively small subgroup of respondents, as livestock production is infrequent in the sample. Key 
inputs are provided by parastatals at 50% discount, but access to subsidies is tied to fulfilling state orders. Since pri-
vate farmers generally do not produce under state orders, parastatal agencies are not the dominant source for the 
supply of farm inputs in the survey. Despite the obvious importance of state agencies as input suppliers, more far-
mers buy their inputs from other private individuals or private commercial firms than from parastatals (except for 
fertilizers and seed; see Table 9). This is a clear indication of an emergent market system for farm inputs despite the 
strict government control in Turkmenistan. Peasant associations are of marginal importance as suppliers of farm in-
puts and provide mainly herbicides, veterinary services, and consulting, which are used by a small proportion of 
farmers. On the whole, farmers do not report major difficulties with purchasing farm inputs and services. The main 
complaint concerns high prices and lack of funds.  
 
3.6  Banking and Credit 
 
Banking to agriculture in general and to private farmers in particular is the monopoly of the state-controlled 
Daikhan Bank (i.e., Peasant Bank in English translation). Private farmers are allowed to hold individual accounts 
and to conduct financial transactions with Daikhan Bank only. Credit to farmers is provided exclusively through 
special government programs administered by Daikhan Bank. Not surprisingly, over 40% of respondents are dissa-
tisfied with the service they receive from this monopolistic financial institution. 
 
 
Investment and working capital financing is provided to private farmers through special government pro-
grams, which are characterized by deeply negative real interest rates and high levels of credit targeting. Those who 
accept state orders for wheat and cotton receive credit against the future harvest at 1% interest rate (in an environ-
ment where inflation averaged 21% in 1998-99, after subsiding from more than 1000% annually in 1993-1995). 
These credits are in addition to the 50% input subsidy, and they cover 35% of total wheat production costs and 25% 
of cotton production costs (Lerman and Stanchin 2001). Independent private farmers and other agricultural produc-
ers operating without state orders are also entitled to subsidized credit, but they have to pay 8-10% nominal interest 
rates (Presidential decree No. 3626, March 4, 1998). This is higher than for producers working under state orders, 
but still deeply negative in real terms.  
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Table 9 Purchase of farm inputs and services (percent of farmers) 
Inputs and services 
Farmers  
purchasing 
the input, % 
Source of supply (percent of those who buy the 
specified input)* 
Difficulties with purchase of inputs 
State  
supplier 
Associations 
Individuals 
Own  
production 
No prob-
lems 
High prices 
Lack of 
funds 
Seeds and seedlings 94 43 7 10 39 84 12 1 
Feed 37 6 9 28 55 21 17 57 
Young animals 32 2 2 33 54 21 9 68 
Fertilizers 92 55 11 20 2 43 37 6 
Manure 88 9 9 16 49 73 7 13 
Herbicides 34 31 41 27 -- 20 13 39 
Farm machinery 72 31 13 46 4 22 23 31 
Repairs, maintenance 52 22 3 47 16 15 24 48 
Spare parts 52 11 3 82 -- 3 35 46 
Fuel 58 46 2 47 -- 26 15 36 
Mechanized field services 93 40 8 40 10 7 31 54 
Transport services 91 41 5 42 9 38 34 8 
Veterinary drugs 22 6 6 81 35 31 31 3 
Veterinary services 30 19 28 42 5 6 13 67 
Construction materials 13 6 6 72 -- 22 10 59 
Construction services 20 4 4 39 4 4 23 67 
Expert consulting 29 29 27 34 2 33 3 51 
* May add up more than 100% because the farmers use multiple sources of supply. 
 
 
Active borrowing – beyond auto-
matic credit for inputs from the Daikhan 
Bank – is extremely limited among pri-
vate farmers. Nearly two-thirds of the res-
pondents indicated that they were unable 
to get any credit. As the main reasons for 
such severe credit constraints they cited 
technical complexity of the loan- applica-
tion system and inability to provide satis-
factory collateral due to the absence of 
mortgage facilities (Table 10). Credit availability does not appear to be a strong constraint. 
 
Less than 10% of respondents reported actual borrowing in 1999. These few borrowers received loans 
mainly from formal sources – from state and commercial banks (Table 11). Contrary to smallholders in some other 
countries, such as Armenia and Georgia, Turkmen farmers do not show special reliance on relatives as a source of 
loans: a higher percentage of respondents borrow from banks than from relatives. Loans received from banks are 
larger than informal loans from relatives, and they naturally carry an interest charge. Interest rates from commercial 
banks are higher than from state banks, and not always negative in real terms. The average loan obtained from banks 
was 43,800 thousand manat, which is approximately equal to one year of sales for the farmers who borrow. 
 
 
Table 11 Sources of credit, loan amounts, and interest rates for private farmers in 1999 
 % of farmers reporting borrowing Average loan amount, thousand manat Interest rate, % 
From all sources 9.1* 34,500 n.a 
State bank 3.5 47,900 2-15 
Commercial banks 3.5 37,000 10-36 
Relatives 2.8 27,333 0 
Other individuals 0.7 1,800 5 
* This is less than the sum of all sources because one farmer borrowed from three sources. 
 
 
Table 10 Difficulties in obtaining credit 
 
Percent of respondents among 
farmers unable to get credit 
(65.7% of all farmers) 
No mortgage facilities 40.4 
Bank requirements too complicated 14.9 
Need credit but do not know how to apply 36.2 
Credit not available 8.5 
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3.7  Outcomes 
 
Despite the rapid growth in the area and the number of private farms since 1993, they account for a very 
small percentage of agricultural land and agricultural output in Turkmenistan (Table 12). Private farms control one-
third of one percent of agricultural land and about 1% of arable land in the country. Cattle herds on private farms in-
creased three-fold between 1997-99, but they still represent merely one-third of one percent of the total number of 
cattle in the country and about one-tenth of one percent of meat and milk production. The share of private farms in 
grain and cotton production is higher, approaching 1% of the country’s total, but it is marginal by all counts.  
 
 
Table 12 Share of private farmers in agricultural land and agricultural output in Turkmenistan 
Year 
Number of 
farmers 
Total area  
allocated to 
private farms, 
thou. ha 
Share of  
private farms 
in agricultural 
land, % 
Cattle Meat Milk Grain Cotton 
1993 750        
1994 3407 81.4 0.25      
1995 4991 98.5 0.30      
1996 5636 105.5 0.33      
1997 6117 109.6 0.34 0.10 0.084 0.102 0.47 0.18 
1998 6809 116.1 0.36 0.13 0.083 0.096 0.74 0.80 
1999 7066 115.0 0.35 0.34 0.087 0.130 0.68 3.75 
Source: Lerman and Stanchin, 2001 for data about private farmers and that FAOSTAT on-line database for Turkmenistan’s total 
production. No production data for private farms are available prior to 1997. Production shares of private farmers should be 
treated as very rough order-of-magnitude estimates, because they have been calculated as the ratio of numbers from two highly 
disparate sources.  
 
 
So far, private farmers have not been able to achieve higher yields than peasant associations. As noted pre-
viously, milk yields range around 1,200 kg per cow per year both for private farms in the survey and for peasant as-
sociations. National data indicate that grain yields are somewhat lower for private farms than for peasant associa-
tions, while yields of vegetables and melons are much lower for private farms (Table 13). It is only in cotton that 
private farms show a certain advantage both in 1998 and 1999. These results are quite disappointing, especially in 
view of the fact that private farms emphasize grain at the expense of cotton (see Table 4 above).   
 
 
Table 13 Crop yields in peasant associations and private farms (in tons per hectare) 
 
1998 1999 
Peasant associations Private farms Peasant associations Private farms 
Cotton (raw) 1.29 1.59 2.10 3.60 
Cotton fiber 1.25 2.03 1.80 2.21 
Grain 1.83 1.67 2.08 1.51 
Vegetables 15.10 7.68 15.85 5.79 
Melons 10.07 4.17 12.41 5.64 
Source: Lerman and Stanchin, 2001 
 
 
Although private farmers have not achieved higher 
productivity, their operations appear to be profitable 
(Table 14). In 1999, the average farm had a gross prof-
it of $2,700 at the official exchange rate ($670 at the 
free-market rate), which is about 55% of total sales 
revenue. The profitable operation of private farms is a 
significant achievement in view of the system of gov-
ernment controls that keeps the producer prices artifi-
cially below world market prices.  
Table 14 Financial performance of the private farms in the 
survey (in thousand manats per farm) 
 1999 2000 est. 
Sales  21,259 24,430 
Cost of production* 9,989 10,486 
Gross profit 11,270 13,944 
* Excluding family labor. 
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Despite these positive outcomes of the process of reform, the private farmers have not had a measurable 
impact on the overall agricultural performance because of their marginal role in the country’s agriculture. With 44%  
of the labor force employed in agriculture, the sector accounts for about 20% of GDP, which suggests that labor is 
still much less productive in agriculture than in other sectors of the economy. Turkmenistan still has a long way to 
go on the path of reform if it is to achieve significant improvements in productivity and efficiency of agriculture. 
 
4.  Constraints for Private Farming in Turkmenistan 
 
The development of private farming in Turkmenistan is hampered by institutional, technological, and fi-
nancial conditions. The main difficulties they face are unfavorable natural conditions (poor soil, scarce water, ineffi-
cient irrigation); lack of funds for purchasing inputs and undertaking farm operations; lack of necessary farm man-
agement skills; uncertain property rights; low government-controlled prices; and export barriers. 
 
One potential advantage of transferring agricultural land to private ownership is to stimulate family invest-
ment in the farm. However, the new private farmers come from the ranks of former collective-farm workers, who 
were notoriously poor and did not bring with them any startup capital to the new venture. Moreover, the legal 
framework in Turkmenistan prohibits virtually all transactions in land, which suggests severely circumscribed own-
ership rights and uncertain security of tenure. Therefore, farmers are understandably reluctant to invest in their land, 
which is reflected in low willingness to borrow. Farmers are not investing in the development of higher yielding 
technologies and in quality seed stocks, while the state will remain unable to fund significant investments in agricul-
tural in the foreseeable future. Altering priorities led to a reduction of state investment in agriculture. The capital-
intensive oil and gas sector now dominates the government’s investment priorities: its share in total investment in-
creased from 9% in 1994 to 48% in 1999. The share of agriculture in total investment accordingly declined from 
15% in 1994 to a mere 2% in 1999, although this sector employs almost half the population (Pomfret 2001).  
 
The pervasive government intervention in agriculture imposes a heavy implied tax on producers. The gov-
ernment-controlled prices for the two strategic commodities – wheat and cotton – are so low that even the seemingly 
generous subsidies that farmers receive in the form of inputs and credit are insufficient to offset the extraction of 
funds from agriculture. Although recent legislation allowed some trade liberalization, the domestic market is limited 
domestically and individual farmers do not have access to export markets. In practice, most farmers are forced to 
sell to the state at prices much below world market prices for their products. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Commercial individual farming in Turkmenistan is conducted on privately owned or leased land using 
mainly family labor. In principle, private farmers have the right to decide what to produce and are allowed to con-
clude voluntary business contracts with legal entities or individuals for the sale of their products at freely negotiated 
prices. In practice, the pervasive system of government subsidies and interventions often prevents farmers from ex-
ercising these options. 
 
Distribution of land for individual use and the introduction of private responsibility for production provide 
incentives to increase productivity and efficiency in agriculture. However, despite the growth in numbers and total 
area, private farms still cultivate only a small percentage of agricultural land and account for a minute share of agri-
cultural production. Private farmers diligently open virgin lands without funds, skills, or machinery. They even 
manage to show a profit, although it may be inadequate given the risks involved in private farming in Turkmenistan. 
The land reform in Turkmenistan works, but it still has not produced measurable impacts on Turkmen agriculture. 
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